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17Finally, equilibrium profits are and or, in general,
It is now possible to verify that the high (low) quality firm prefers partial to
full market coverage if (2.4897). Analogous conclusions can be reached when more
than two varieties are produced.











16The behaviour of the single-product monopolist under full market coverage is described
in Section 2. I am now in a position to compare the performance of the monopolist in the two
alternative settings. The following obtains:
for all In particular, condition (a5) holds as a strict inequality for all values of except
for which it holds as an equality. Analogous calculations are needed to obtain the same
results when more than one product is supplied.
Consider now the oligopoly problem. Here I shall confine myself to a duopoly, showing
that if both prices and qualities are optimally set by duopolists, there exists an interval for the
relevant parameter where firms strictly prefer to serve all consumers, while the opposite holds
outsidesuchinterval.Consideraduopolymadeupbysingleproductfirms.Underthefullmarket
coverage assumption, provided it can be shown that duopolists symmetrically locate
theirrespective varietiesoutside therangedefinedby consumers’ preferredqualitiesand obtain
(seeCremerandThisse,1994).Underthepartialmarketcoverageassumption,
the poorest consumers are not being served, so that demands are defined as follows:
Profits are defined as in (13). The standard solution concept is the subgame perfect equilibrium
in two stages. Proceeding as usual by backward induction, one can solve for the simultaneous
























First, I am going to show that a single-product monopolist weakly prefers partial to full
marketcoverage. This result extendsintuitively to thecaseof a multiproductmonopolist. Istart
by considering a monopolist who is only partially serving the market, selling a single variety.
The demand for her product is:
so that the monopolist’s profit function is:
Observe that, potentially, the monopolist could choose not to exclude any individual from
consumption by setting the price-quality ratio below so as to serve the entire market. If this
doesnotobtainsatequilibrium,itimplicitlymeansthatthemonopolistprefersquantityrestriction
to quality distortion. Optimal quality and price can be obtained by solving the first order
conditions (it can be easily shown that second order conditions are also satisfied):

































14a long run commitment, so that the quality level of the existing variety cannot be adjusted as a
reaction to the introduction of an innovation.
In order to answer the above question, an adapted version of the well known efficiency
effect has been evaluated. Due to the fact that the market is completely covered, the direction
of the efficiency effect depends on the distribution of income, in that it leads to the conclusion
that the incumbent is more incentivated to innovate than the entrant only if the marginal
willingness to pay characterizing consumers is sufficiently high to justify the introduction of a
new variety. Otherwise, it works in such a way that market competition is observed once the
innovation has been introduced, independently of which of the two firm has won the auction.
According to the above results, it is possible to conclude that if the marginal willingness
topayforquality issufficientlylow,the"observational"outcomeisthattheentrant hasahigher
incentive than the incumbent and bids more for the innovation, introducing a variety of higher
qualitythantheonealreadybeingsuppliedbytheincumbent.Thus,fullmarketcoverageappears
as an indirect tool that a regulator may adopt so as to positively affect competition and social
welfare,providedthat theincumbentfirmhas tied herownhands by producinga certainquality
without anticipating the auction for an innovation.
Finally,itappearsdesirableforfutureresearchtoinvestigatethealternativesettingswhere
(i) technology is characterized by a different degree of convexity; and/or (ii) the distribution of
consumers is non-uniform, e.g., the number of consumers characterized by a low marginal
willingnesstopayforqualityislargerthanthenumberofconsumerswhosemarginalwillingness
to pay is high; and/or (iii) the incumbent anticipates the possibility of an innovation, but there
is uncertainty about the auction date.
13effect is such to operate so as to bring about a change in market structure from the previous
monopolyinto adifferentiatedduopolywherethehigh quality goodis suppliedby thefirmwho
either has entered the market later or has acquired the right to innovate by winning the auction.
Incidentally, notice that this argument also implies that that when consumers are sufficiently
poor firms cannot gain from collusion, as there exists an interval for the marginal willingness
to pay where cartel profits are strictly lower than the sum of the noncooperative ones.
Second, it might be easily checked that in any other setting the efficiency effect would
work univocally to the advantage of the incumbent, leading to the persistence of monopoly for
allparametersvalues.Thiswouldbeparticularlyevidentiffirmswereabletoadjustbothqualities
atthetimeofadoptionoftheinnovation,i.e.,intheabsenceofsunkcosts.Furthermore,itwould
intuitively apply if firms were allowed to choose whether to serve the entire market or restrict
output according to the relative profit performance attainable in the two cases. The persistence
of monopoly would obtain as well if the incumbent firm could anticipate the auction for the
innovationatsometimeinthefutureandadjustedthequalityoftheexistingproductaccordingly
in advance, thus being able to bid more than the entrant.
Finally, in the light of the above analysis, the motivation at the basis of the full market
coverage assumption is twofold. On the one hand, a regulator may oblige the monopolist to
serve all consumers so as to increase social welfare. On the other, the regulator may introduce
such a rule anticipating that this may favour innovation so as to create market competition
irrespectively of the innovator’s identity.
6. Conclusions
In a model of vertical product differentiation with convex variable production costs of
quality,Ihaveaddressedthequestionwhetherinamarketforendogenouslydifferentiatedgoods
theincumbenthas ahigher incentiveto innovateascomparedto thepotential entrant,under full
market coverage. I have also assumed that quality is chosen once and for all, i.e., it represents
12theincumbentisalsoindifferentbetweenintroducingthenewvarietyfromaboveorfrombelow.
Otherwise, if the incumbent is at best able to replicate the profit
performance of non colluding duopolists,
4 by resorting to the noncooperative maximization of
the profits separately accruing to the two varieties, and virtually giving up her identity as a
monopolistherprice-and-quantitysettingbehaviourisconcerned.Hence,eitherofthetwofirms
mayinnovate, yielding aduopolistic market wherethe quality of thenew product ishigher than
the quality of the one already available, and variety innovation leads to an outcome which is
observationally equivalent in either case.
5 Q.E.D.
A few comments are now in order. First, the effect I have taken into account, although
adapted to a context of endogenous differentiation, closely reflects the efficiency effect, as
defined by Fudenberg and Tirole (1986) and Tirole (1988) following Arrow (1962), analogous
to the incentive to pre-empt of Katz and Shapiro (1987) and the competitive threat effect of
Beath et al. (1989). Contrarily to the results emerging from these contributions, where under
competitionwithhomogeneousproductstheefficiencyeffectunivocallyfavoursthepersistence
of monopoly, here the assumption of full market coverage makes it possible for the efficiency
effecttoworkintheoppositedirection,sincethemonopolistwould prefernotto servetheentire
market, provided that revenues increase linearly in quality while costs increase with the square
ofquality(seeMussaandRosen,1978;Besankoetal.,1987;andtheAppendix),whileduopolists
mayprefereither market regime,depending on the levelof themarginal willingness to pay (see
theAppendix).Consequently,thereexistanintervalfor asdefinedabove,wheretheefficiency
qÎ ] 1,1+2Ö `` ` 219/27[,
q
4. Notice that even in such an extreme situation the incumbent still have an incentive to
innovate, not only as a preemptive strategy but also because if the overall
profitsaccruingtononcolludingduopolistsarestrictlyhigherthanthemonopolisticprofitwhen
a single variety is supplied, provided k<1/27t.
5.Itisworthstressingthatthismirrorswhathappenswithhomogeneousgoodswhenfirms
bids for a drastic process innovation. In such a case, though, monopoly persists independently
of the identity of the innovator.
qÎ ] 1,1+2Ö `` ` 219/27]
11PROPOSITION. If the marginal willingness to pay for quality is sufficiently high and the
incumbent maximizes the joint profits associated with the two varieties, she is able to bid more
for the innovation and thus remains a monopolist. Otherwise, irrespectively of the innovator’s
identity, innovation by either firm yields a noncooperative duopoly outcome, where
observationally the entrant bids more for the innovation and enters the market with a variety of
higher quality than the incumbent’s.
PROOF. Consider first the relative performances in terms of profits of a monopolist offering
twoproductsversustwooligopolistsofferingasinglevarietyeach.Theincumbentwillbidmore
for the innovation, and thus remain a monopolist, if the following inequality is met:
that is
which, after simple manipulations, yields
Condition(21)issatisfiedfor Thisimpliesthattheincumbentbidsmorethan
the entrant and remains thus a monopolist when consumers are sufficiently rich. In such a case,
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10which yields the critical points and The second order
condition is satisfied only by qLe1, yielding gross profits and
Demands are xHe=4/9 and xLi=5/9, while finally prices are and
with pHe>pLi>0 by virtue of the overall viability condition
accordingto which Notice that, as it could beexpected from theoutset, innovation by the
entrant implies an increase in the degree of differentiation as compared to what obtains if the
innovation is introduced by the incumbent.
The opposite perspective, where the entrants innovates from below, can be quickly dealt
with.QualitiesareqHiandqLe, respectively.Theuniquemaximumof isat
yielding and as the duopolistic profits. Since the latter are both
lowerthanthose obtainedin thepreviouscase, itappears that not only theentrant would choose
to compete from above,
3 but both firms would strictly agree on that.
5. The persistence of monopoly
I am now able to assess the relative size of the incentives to innovate for the incumbent
and the entrant, in order to understand whether in a vertically differentiated market like the one
describedintheprevioussectionsamonopolyregimecanbeexpectedtopersistundersequential












qHe1 =( 3q+1)/(6t) qHe2 =( q+3)/(2t).






qLe =( 3q-5)/(6t), pLe
pHi = 49/(243t)p Le = 4/(243t)
3.This result sharplycontrasts with a large part of theexisting literature, e.g., Shakedand
Sutton(1982,1983),wherefirmsfilltheproductrangestartingfromthetopquality.Thedifferent
behaviour of the two models is due to the fact that here production costs are convex in quality.
9wheredemandsxHandxLaredefined as in (7). Theproblem canbe solvedas usualby backward
induction. From the first order conditions
the following noncooperative equilibrium prices can be obtained:
Hence, the profit functions (13) at the quality stage look as follows:
Providedtheincumbentproducesagoodofquality theentranthastochoosebetween
competingfromaboveorfrombelow.Assumeshedecidestoenterwithahigherqualityproduct.
In such a case, adding indexes i and e to identify the incumbent and the entrant, respectively,
the incumbent supplies Substituting the latter in (17) and differentiating
w.r.t. qHe, the first order condition for the entrant obtains:
pH =(pH -tqH











































qLi =( q-1)/(2t). pH
8Consider now what happens if the monopolist starts producing a good whose quality is
lower than that already available, i.e., assume Proceeding as above, from the
first order condition
Iobtain and asthetwocriticalpoints.SinceonlyqL2satisfies
the second order condition, it represents the candidate innovation from below, yielding
as the profits gross of fixed costs accruing to the two-product
monopolist. It appears immediately that they coincide with those obtained in the previous case,
sothat thechoice betweenintroducing thenew varietyfromaboveor frombelowdependsupon
the conditions on ensuring the positivity of prices. In this setting, prices are
which is always positive given that the above viability condition
mustbemet,and whichispositiveif The sameconditionmust
be satisfied in order for qL2 to be positive. Demands are xH=2/3 and xL=1/3 and the degree of
differentiation is the same as above. Post-innovation momopoly profits are strictly greater than
pre-innovation gross profits for all admissible values of The same holds for net profits if
k<1/27t. Hence, if the monopolist is indifferent between the two available alternatives,
while if she innovates from above, obtaining the same profit in either case.
4. Innovation by the entrant
I focus now on the setting where the entrant introduces a new variety and then plays
simultaneouslyinpricesagainsttheincumbent.Theprofits,grossoffixedcosts,associatedwith






















7The price of the low quality good is while that of the high quality good is
obtained from the first order condition for profit maximization:
Substitutingpricesinto(8),themonopolist’sprofitcanbewrittenasafunctionofqualitiesonly:
I am now in a position to investigate which kind of quality the monopolist would assign
to a new product. Assume first that the monopolist introduces a new variety from above, i.e.,
The candidate new variety has to be selected between the critical points of the
first order condition:
which are and Since only qH1 satisfies the second order
conditionforamaximum, isthecandidatehighquality,yielding aprofitgross
of fixed costs equal to Prices are and
whicharebothpositivegiventheviabilitycondition DemandsarexH=1/3
and xL=2/3. Finally, the degree of differentiation, measured by the distance between the two
goods along the quality spectrum, is qH-qL=1/(3t).
pL = qqL =( q-1)qL,
¶pM
¶pH
= 0 Þ pH
* =
qqH +tqH
































qH1 =( 3q-1)/(6t) qH2 =( q+1)/(2t).
qH =( 3q-1)/(6t)
pM =( 27q





which denotes the quality preferred by the consumer characterized by the lowest marginal
willingness to pay for quality, Furthermore, notice that a social planner aiming at the
maximization of social welfare would supply the quality preferred by the average consumer
characterized by i.e.,
2
3. Innovation by the incumbent
I shall focus here on the introduction of a new variety by the monopolist, given that the
quality already being supplied is fixed at Generally speaking, the monopolist will offer
a high and a low quality product, segmenting the market in such a way that the demand for the
the two products are:
and the profit function is




















monopolist’s behaviour takes into account the marginal consumer, while the social planner’s
one takes into account the average consumer (see Spence, 1975, and Tirole, 1988, ch. 2). It can
beshownthat whenthe numberof varietiesbeingsupplied tendsto infinity(or quality becomes
a continuous variable) the monopolist ends up offering the socially optimal top quality, while
she keeps undersupplying all theother qualities. Indeed, the distance between the monopolist’s
lowest quality and the social planner’s one is maximized when the number of varieties tends to
infinity (see Mussa and Rosen, 1978; Itoh, 1983; and Besanko et al., 1987).
5theincumbentfinds it advantageousto innovateindependentlyof anyentry threat,andshe does
not gainany profitfrom keepingthe patent asleep.The presence of asunk cost also implies that
quality cannot be changed as a reaction to the introduction of a new variety, either by the same
firm or by a rival. Provided the market is completely covered, the monopolist’s profit function
is the following:
It can be immediately verified that
this can be given the following intuitive explanation: since by assumption all consumers buy a
unit of the good, the monopolist sets the maximum price consistent with this assumption, and
since costs are convex in quality, supplies the minimum quality in the range of consumers’
preferred qualities, which can be defined considering the quality levels required by
themaximizationofconsumersurplus(1)wheneachvarietyissoldatmarginalcost(seeCremer
and Thisse, 1994).
Notice that the maximum price is given by
Substituting (5) into (3), the monopolist’s profit function is defined in terms of qM only:










max = qqM.( 5
4of the model as well as the optimal price and quality choices by a single product monopolist.
InSection 3 I describethechoice ofa secondquality by theincumbent. The entrant’s behaviour
isinvestigatedinSection4.TheissueofthepersistenceofmonopolyisthenaddressedinSection
5. Finally, Section 6 provides concluding comments.
2. Single product monopolist
Consider a single product monopolist operating in a market for a vertically differentiated
good whereconsumers arecharacterizedby a marginalwillingness to payfor quality
The population of consumer is uniformly distributed over the interval, with
density 1, so that the total number of consumers in this market is also 1. Individuals derive a
net surplus from consumption defined as follows:
where q is the quality level and p is the price at which such a quality is being supplied. It is
assumed that all of them buy one unit of the differentiated product, i.e., that (1) is satisfied at
least as an equality for all consumers.
Technologyisdescribedbyacostfunctionwhichisconvexinqualityandlinearinquantity,
while the introduction of a product involves a sunk cost, or equivalently a fixed entry feefor
eachvariety, givenby kand independentof the quality level, so that total costs for each product
are:
wherexis theoutput leveland t isa positiveparameter. The condition imposed onk is suchthat
qÎ[ q,q],
q=q+1. q>0,
U =q q - p ³ 0,( 1
C = tq




3the strategic choice of product quality has been tackled only by Donnenfeld and Weber (1995).
Though, they do not specifically deal with the related problem of the persistence of monopoly
which has been largely debated in the R&D literature (Gilbert and Newbery, 1982, 1984;
Reinganum, 1983, to mention only the seminal contributions). Provided that a monopolist can
at least replicate the oligopolists’ performance, these contributions generally lead to the
conclusion that monopoly persists since the incumbent has a greater incentive to innovate or
preempt than the rival has to enter.
I will focus on the issue of the persistence of monopoly by analysing an adapted version
of the so called efficiency effect (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1986; Tirole, 1988) in a vertically
differentiated market where it is assumed that all consumers buy one unit of the differentiated
good independently of the number of firms or goods. I shall assume that at a certain date an
incumbent, which is already supplying a vertically differentiated product whose quality cannot
be changed, and a potential entrant participate to an auction for a new product characterized by
a different quality. The firm who can bid more for the innovation acquires the right to produce
agoodwhosequalityisthenoptimallydefinedaccordingtotheexistingone,inordertomaximize
either monopolistic profit, if themonopolist is the winner, or the entrant’s profit in the opposite
case. Then, prices are set according to the market structure previously emerged.
Iwillshowthat,duetotheassumptionoffullmarketcoverage,whichmayappearplausible
for instance when public utilities are considered, the efficiency effect operates so as to favour
thepersistenceofmonopolyonlyifconsumersaresufficientlyrich.Insuchacase,theincumbent
is indifferent between introducing the new quality from below or above the existing one.
Otherwise,theincumbentofferingtwovarietiescanatmostmimictheduopolists’performance,
so that the outcomes associated with innovation by either firm are observationally equivalent,
in that both lead to a noncooperative duopoly where the innovation is characterized by a higher
quality as compared to the already existing variety.
Theremainderof thepaperisorganizedasfollows. Section2 isdevotedto thedescription
21. Introduction
We avail of a relatively large literature on the optimal choice of product quality by
oligopolists under either Bertrand or Cournot competition and simultaneous play (Shaked and
Sutton, 1982, 1983; Bonanno, 1986, inter alia). The sequential introduction of new products
hasbeenanalysedbyDonnenfeldandWeber(1992,1995)withoutexplicitlytakingintoaccount
R&D efforts, which are instead the focus of the contributions due to Beath et al. (1987), Motta
(1992) and Rosenkranz (1995a,b). Beath et al. (1987) extend the analysis of Vickers (1986) to
the case of product innovation under vertical differentiation when there is a repeated patent
auctionforinnovations. Leaving theissue ofthestrategic timingof innovation outsidethemain
analysis, they find how the conditions for the persistence of quality leadership look like. Along
related lines, Rosenkranz (1995b) shows that the low-quality firm has a higher incentive to
innovate if the adjustment cost is sufficiently high. She also shows that a change of leadership
can be observed whenever adjustment cost is high or the degree of differentiation at the outset
is high enough. Motta (1992) investigate the impact of cooperation in the R&D stage on the
overall level of research effort and market structure. In his model, R&D is simply a tool for
improvingproductqualityprovidedfirmshavealreadyenteredthemarket.Firmsentercostlessly
and simultaneously, so that the timing of innovation is exogenous. In Rosenkranz (1995a) both
the quality and the timing of innovations are endogenous, and the author investigates the
conditions under which firms are incentivated to form a research joint venture. In the context
of horizontal differentiation, R&D competition between two firms both racing for the optimal
monopolistic location, i.e., the midpoint of the linear city, has been analysed by Harter (1993).
Product proliferation as a preemptive strategy has been investigated in countless
contribution, dealing mainnly with spatial differentiation (Hay, 1976; Eaton and Lipsey, 1979;
Bonanno,1987, interalia).
1 Tothe best of my knowledge, theissue ofentry deterrence through
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Abstract
The incentives to innovate for the incumbent and the entrant in a vertically differentiated
market are analised, in the absence of uncertainty. It turns out that if consumers’ marginal
willingness to pay for quality is sufficiently low, the efficiency effect observationally works so
as to favour innovation by the entrant, i.e., competition. Otherwise, it operates to the advantage
of the incumbent who acquire the right to innovate, preempting thus the rival.
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